Focus Report: Volume 75, Number 2, January 1997 Page: 2
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Page 2 House Research Orqanization
Court rules stalking law
unconstitutional
The Court of Criminal Appeals by 7-0 struck down
the state's 1993 stalking statute as unconstitutionally
vague, effectively nullifying the state's current stalking
law. Convictions under the 1993 law would be rendered
void, and anyone convicted could be released from
custody or other terms of supervision. Since first
offenses under the 1993 law were misdemeanors
punishable by a maximum of one year in jail, first-time
offenders would likely not be in jail or under
supervision now, but rendering the convictions void
could affect punishment if the offender was later
convicted of another crime. Convictions under the
stalking law as it was revised in 1995 are also likely to
be challenged since most of the 1993 provisions struck
down by the court were not changed.
There is no statewide estimate of the number of
convictions affected by the ruling. However, in the first
part of 1996, before the court ruled the law
unconstitutional, about 300 stalking cases were filed in
Dallas County and about 36 in Travis County. Many
prosecutors have said they plan to refile charges against
persons whose convictions were affected by the recent
ruling if the statute of limitations has not run out or the
circumstances fit another offense.
The court outlined three problems with the 1993
statute: the vagueness of the language describing the
prohibited conduct and the lack of a "reasonable person"
standard for determining when conduct constitutes
stalking; the lack of a requirement that two acts of
stalking have a link or "nexus;" and the law's pre-1995
requirement that one previous incident of stalking have
been reported to law enforcement for an offense to
occur.
Vagueness and lack of a reasonable person
standard. Part of the statute describing the conduct
that constitutes stalking contains vague language, and the
law lacks a "reasonable person" or other standard of
interpretation that would cure the vagueness problem,
the court said.
The court criticized section (a)(7)(A) of the 1993
stalking statute that partially defines the offense as
being when a person:the other person, including following
that person, that is reasonably likely to
harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment,
or embarrass that person.
This description covers any conduct in which a
person could possibly engage and is even more broad
than in a 1983 Texas stalking statute that had been ruled
unconstitutionally vague by the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals. The 1983 statute, which prohibited
communications by telephone or writing in "vulgar,
profane, obscene or indecent language or in a coarse
and offensive manner ... to annoy or alarm the
recipient," did not adequately define what conduct was
prohibited or whose sensitivity must be offended,
according to the federal court decision, Kramer v.
Price, 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983), that threw out the
1983 law.
The Court of Criminal Appeals said of the 1993
statute: "The words 'annoy' and 'alarm' remain in the
statute although they are now joined by the words
'harass,' 'abuse,' 'torment,' and 'embarrass.' But, all
these terms are joined with a disjunctive 'or,' and thus
do nothing to limit the vagueness originally generated
by 'annoy' and 'alarm.' Moreover, the additional terms
are themselves susceptible to uncertainties of meaning."
The court said the law also lacks a reasonable person
standard, which is commonly used in laws to determine
how a reasonable person would act in similar
circumstances. Without a reasonable person standard or
other clarifying provisions in the law, it is unclear from
whose perspective - the victim, the accused, a
reasonable person or another - the probability that an
accused stalker's conduct is "reasonably likely" to
harass someone can be determined, the court said.
Link between stalking "threat" and
"conduct." The court also objected to the provision
that requires one stalking act to involve a threat while
the other act may involve certain types of conduct.
One stalking incident must involve a threat to inflict
bodily injury on the victim or to commit an offense
against the victim or the victim's family or property.
However, the other stalking instance can be conduct
directed toward the victim, including following the
victim, that is reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm,
abuse, torment or embarrass the victim. The court
decided that the description of conduct is vague.on more than one occasion engages in
conduct directed specifically towardPage 2
House Research Organization
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Texas. Legislature. House of Representatives. Research Organization. Focus Report: Volume 75, Number 2, January 1997, periodical, January 10, 1997; Austin, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth641421/m1/2/: accessed May 21, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.