Texas Journal of Genealogy and History, Volume I, Fall 2002 Page: 5
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resources Japan would have to wage
war, but with limited oil waging war was
difficult. The defeat of France and Hol-
land coupled with Britain's desperate
situation in the late spring of 1940
seemed to provide Japan with the op-
portunity to seize resource-rich territo-
ries in Southeast Asia.
At the same time, however, the
United States was taking steps to fore-
stall further Japanese expansion. Follow-
ing its maneuvers in the spring 1940,
which was carried out in Pacific waters,
the U.S. Pacific fleet was ordered to
maintain its headquarters and fighting
units at Pearl Harbor on the Island of
Oahu. Even though this made fleet sup-
port and maintenance very difficult, it
was hoped that it would provide a deter-
rent effect. The increased naval presence
in the Pacific was followed in July 1940
by a U.S. embargo on the export of avia-
tion fuel and lubricants to Japan. The
Japanese were irritated and surprised by
these events, but undeterred. They in
turn, in an attempt to close off supply
routes to the beleaguered Chinese resis-
tance, forced the French Vichy regime
to accept Japanese troops and airbases
into Northern Indochina in September
1940. They occupied the remainder of
French Indochina in July 1941. The im-
mediate United States response to this
second act came on July 26, 1941. Presi-
dent Roosevelt signed an Executive Or-
der freezing all Japanese assets in the
United States. The effect of this was to
create an economic blockade of Japan.
On the same day, the President nation-
alized the Philippine Army and named
General Douglas MacArthur, Com-
manding General United States Army
Forces Far East. The moment of truth
for Japanese decision-makers had ar-
rived.4
The Japanese economy had, according
to her experts on the powerful Planning
Board, enough oil for two years. After
that Japan would be at the mercy of the
United States, its powerful economy,
and its rapidly expanding Navy. Admiral
Nagano, Chief of the Naval General
Staff, informed the emperor that the
fleet had enough oil for eighteen months
of operations. Here seemed to be the
stark dilemma - gain the resources they
needed quickly or concede to United
States demands to withdraw from China
and Indo-China. Since the later was un-
acceptable to the Japanese, war was the
only choice if diplomacy failed to change
the American position.
From July to October 1941 a great
debate raged inside the Japanese Gov-
ernment and among is military leaders.
Premier Konoye and Admiral Nogano
both believed that war with the UnitedStates would bring disaster. Simulta-
neously, however, army and navy staffs
debated and gamed each possible se-
quence of operations that would bring
the oil of the Indies into their hands
with the least danger from British and
American counterstrokes from Malaya
and the Philippines. In the end a strange
compromise was reached that satisfied
both army and navy planners. Dutch,
British, and United States possessions in
the Far East would be attacked simulta-
neously. But even here a difficulty pre-
sented itself. How could Japan hope to
be successful with the United States Pa-
cific Fleet and its forward base at Pearl
Harbor intact. Up to this time, Japanese
naval strategists had planned to harass
the United States Fleet as it sortied
across the Pacific to protect the Philip-
pines and then destroy it in a battle of
annihilation in the Philippine Sea. Now
a new plan emerged.
In January 1941, Admiral Yamamoto
Isoroku, Commander-in-Chief of the
Combined Fleet, raised the possibility of
a carrier-launched strike against Pearl
Harbor.5 Lieutenant Commander Genda
Minoru began feasibility studies. The
concept was not new and in fact had
been included in theoretical studies and
war games of both the Japanese and
United States throughout the 1930s. The
practical application of such a plan was,
however, daunting. In April the neces-
sary instrument for such an attack, the
First Carrier Strike Force was created,
but it was not until September that a
detailed plan was gamed. It was during
this war-gaming that a decision was
made that the combined attack and inva-
sion of Oahu was not feasible. Strangely
it was only at this late date that Admiral
Nagano and the Navy General Staff
learned of the advanced stage of this
planning.
Examination of the decision-making
process within the Japanese government
has a surreal quality. It is clear that as
early as July powerful forces in the Japa-
nese Armed Forces, in and outside the
government, had decided that war was
the only viable option. They pressured
the civilian authorities to procure the
needed oil in the Indies through diplo-
macy or to step aside. The pressure
mounted through the early fall and in
October Premier Konoye resigned and
on October 18 General Tojo Hedeki
formed a new government as both Pre-
mier and Minister of the Army. The fol-
lowing day Admiral Yamamoto, though
he had argued against war with the
United States, insisted that if Japan was
to fight it must begin with a powerful
strike against Pearl Harbor with all
available carrier forces.Even then negotiations with the
United States continued. General Tojo
testified after the war that he did not
learn of the Pearl Harbor plan until No-
vember 30, the day before the Cabinet
meeting where, in the presence of the
Emperor, the decision to make war on
the United States. By then the carrier
strike force was already six days on its
way to Pearl Harbor.6
One of the enduring myths surround-
ing the outbreak of World War II is that
the United States was blithefully un-
aware of the mounting danger and was
totally unprepared for war. Between
1935 and 1937, the Congress passed a
series of Neutrality Acts to insure that
the United States did not become in-
volved in another World War I like con-
flict. Nevertheless the American people
sympathized with the victims of mount-
ing German and Japanese aggression
and the Roosevelt Administration be-
came less and less sanguine that we
could avoid war. In the late 1930s the
United States began to seriously look to
its defenses.
Navy ship procurement increased no-
ticeably. The number of surface warships
increased from 153 in 1937 to 225 at the
time of Pearl Harbor and in the same
period the total ship strength increased
from 335 to 790.7 Included in that num-
ber were two new classes of battleships,
the North Carolina Class followed by
the South Dakota Class. Comprising a
total of six new battleships, they were
first laid down since 1921. Although only
the North Carolina and the Washington
were ready when war broke out, the 16"
gun South Dakotas were all ready in
1942.8 These were to be joined by the
new Essex Class fast fleet carriers, the
first three of which, the Essex, the York-
town, and the Intrepid, were laid down
in 1941 before the outbreak of war.
The Army also went through a major
metamorphosis. Beginning gradually in
the 1930's the buildup gained momen-
tum after the outbreak of European war
in 1939. Congress authorized the feder-
alization of the National Guard and Or-
ganized Reserves in August 1940 and in
September passed the Selective Service
act creating the first peacetime draft in
American history. By the fall of 1941,
the active army numbered 1,644,000 men
organized in 44.9
Although it was little known at the
time and generally forgotten now, the
United States was in fact already in
combat in the Atlantic by the spring of
1941.10 Attacks on U.S flagged merchant
ships took place throughout the year.
The navy was also in action. The USS
Niblack depth-charged a German U-boat
on April 10, 1941 while trying to protect5
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Howard Payne University. Texas Journal of Genealogy and History, Volume I, Fall 2002, periodical, 2002; Brownwood, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth599838/m1/8/: accessed May 30, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Howard Payne University Library.