Texas Journal of Genealogy and History, Volume I, Fall 2002 Page: 30
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Hill. Colquitt lost over 350, while Ripley
sustained losses numbering but sixty-
nine. J.R. Anderson, of Longstreet's di-
vision, lost perhaps as many as five hun-
dred, and Pickett took similar casualties,
426 in total. Wilcox's brigade reported
584 killed, missing, and wounded. Pryor
lost over 850, and Featherston 666, at
Gaines' Mill and Glendale. A.P. Hill's
division lost over four thousand men
between 27 June and 30 June. Gregg's
brigade lost over nine hundred; Pend-
er's, eight hundred. The losses sustained
by A.P. Hill's division alone outpaces
those of Jackson's entire group, consist-
ing of the divisions of Ewell, Whiting,
D.H. Hill, and Jackson's own.65
At what cost?
Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had
carried the day; but at what cost? The
casualty statistics are a telling sign; Lee's
victory came at a steep price for the
Confederate army. Hood's Texas Bri-
gade was especially hard hit, along with
A.P. Hill's entire division, followed
closely by Ewell's. In a scenario repeated
at Chancellorsville, Lee would sustain
losses at an entirely unacceptable rate.
The Confederate States of America sim-
ply had not the manpower to continue
reinforcing Lee at a rate commensurate
to that at which he absorbed losses.
This, however, is said with the benefit of
perfect hindsight. At the ill-named Bat-
tle of Gaines' Mill, also referred to as
that of Cold Harbor, Lee took advan-
tage of McClellan's tentativeness and
boldly and daringly maneuvered around
a weaker force, driving them away from
the Confederate capital.
McClellan failed to keep sight of
Richmond, his ultimate objective. By
allowing Lee's maneuvering to dissuade
him from pressing the attack, McClellan
lost the tactical advantage of being on
the offensive. The lion's share of Mc-
Clellan's vaunted Army of the Potomac
remained stationary, south of the Chic-
kahominy, unable and unwilling to assist
Porter on the north side of that river.
This is due in no small part to the knack
for the theatrical exhibited by Magruder
for not the first time on 27 June. His
demonstrations in the woods opposite
McClellan's main body convinced the
latter commander that he was about to
be assaulted by a force twice his own
100,000 men. In reality, only a few thou-
sand Confederates stood between Mc-
Clellan and Richmond. The Union gen-
eral showed his characteristic
unwillingness to risk taking the initiative,
and willingly accepted the role-reversal
from attacking to defending. Lee, mean-while, readily seized upon this inactivity
and took the Confederates directly on
the offensive, though perhaps too boldly
for the long-term welfare of the Confed-
eracy. His losses were indeed high, and
would only increase in future engage-
ments, but Lee kept his objective in the
crosshairs of the Army of Northern Vir-
ginia - drive McClellan from Rich-
mond's doorstep. This was accomplished
by the offensive begun around Gaines'
Mill, concluded over the course of seven
days at the end of June and beginning of
July.
Lee initially failed in the principle of
economy of force. Gregg and Pender's
brigades were both thrust upon heavily
fortified positions, and were very nearly
annihilated. Lee seemed temporarily para-
lyzed by the uncharacteristic tardiness of
Jackson, and allowed his subordinates and
the enemy to dictate the day's action well
into the afternoon. Until Lee finally uni-
fied his field command and mounted a
unified assault, Porter held the advantage
in this tactical area. The Union com-
mander of V Corps deftly held nearly two
miles through his brilliant judgment in
selecting a defensible position, as well as
his stationing of troops and small reserve.
However, once Lee's entire force arrived,
the Confederate general employed the
principle of mass to his advantage. He was
able to thrust forward a numerically supe-
rior force upon a more exhausted enemy.
In so doing, Lee maneuvered his forces so
as to pinch in on both Union flanks simul-
taneously, as well as directing the capture
of key hills and artillery batteries that en-
abled the general assault to press onward.
Porter, out-manned and outmaneuvered,
had little choice but to hold his position as
long as possible, awaiting reinforcements
or nightfall. Both came too late, and Por-
ter was driven from the field in a tremen-
dous victory, both tactical and moral, for
the Confederates.
A large portion of the blame for the
Union defeat lies in McClellan's shoddy
intelligence operations. As has been
mentioned numerous times, McClellan
was utterly convinced that he was out-
numbered at least two-to-one. His con-
stant wirings to Washington requesting
reinforcements for his Peninsular Cam-
paign ultimately led to his dismissal, in
favor of Pope, by early August. In spite
of his anxieties, McClellan should have
been able to press the situation on 26/27
June to his own advantage: Porter occu-
pied an impregnable position on Beaver
Dam Creek, and was not far away from
a very desirable flanking position north
of Richmond. McClellan fell prey to his
own failed reconnaissance and the fears
of his generals, who believed Magruder's
force to be immense. Porter, too, over-estimated the numbers opposite him on
27 June, albeit much closer to reality in
claiming he was attacked at a three-to-
one ratio. Lee also suffered from faulty
intelligence. His initial plan, which called
on four segments of his army to inter-
sect Porter's force from four different
roads, failed upon the latter's unex-
pected withdrawal on the morning of the
27h. However, Lee received adequate
intelligence throughout the rest of the
battle, and won victory. Ironically, it is
Lee's inaccurate information regarding
the composition of McClellan's troops
that proved of paramount importance to
his success. Had he realized that a little
more than sixty-thousand Union troops
were separated from Richmond by two
lone divisions, it seems quite doubtful
that even Lee would be so intrepid as to
divide his force as he did. In the end, it
was this miscalculation that gave Lee the
sheer force required to overrun the
Union lines around Boatswain's Creek.
The element of surprise seemed to
play a bit role in this affair, being limited
mainly to Porter's withdrawal in the
morning. However, this was closely mon-
itored by A.P. Hill's advance units, so it
cannot be said that Porter maintained
complete surprise upon taking up the
positions he did. Neither did Lee main-
tain total unpredictability in attacking as
he did. The length of the day's battle
and the thinness of Porter's lines felled
the Union position just as much as did
Lee's unpredictability. If anything took
the Union troops by surprise, it was
Hood's incredible charge up Turkey Hill.
The simplicity of Lee's final assault
was born out of his unification of battle-
field command. When he arrived on the
scene, Lee found every commander giv-
ing orders individually; this is seconded
by Hood's accounts. However, by 7
P.M., Lee left little doubt as to who was
controlling the action on the field. The
plan was simple; only such a plan could
have been executed under the conditions
presented by the terrain and the Union
fortifications. Porter maintained a rela-
tively simple plan and unified command
throughout, but again, simply lacked the
strength in numbers to make his position
a tenable one.
In the end, it can be easily said that
the Battle of Gaines' Mill marked the
beginning of the end for McClellan's
Peninsular Campaign. The Army of the
Potomac retreated further and further
down the peninsula, finally to Harrison's
Landing by 1 July, far to the south of
their position at the White House late in
June. A month later McClellan had
been relieved of his command; Lee was
restructuring and refitting his Army of
Northern Virginia for their first foray30
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Howard Payne University. Texas Journal of Genealogy and History, Volume I, Fall 2002, periodical, 2002; Brownwood, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth599838/m1/33/: accessed May 30, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Howard Payne University Library.