Reports of cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas during a part of December term, 1849, at Austin and a part of Galveston Term, 1851. Volume 5. Page: 63
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AUSTIN, 1849. 125-12
Snoddy v. Cage.
sense of the profession, from which are derived the lights by which the courts
themselves mnst be guided in their determination.
Tlat the construction to which I adhere lhas not arisen from any disfavor to
statutes of limitation in general is, I think, sufficiently apparent from the autiorities
to which I have referred, where it is made to rest, not upon any
sl:visl, blind adherence to precedent and authority, but upon what tle courts
have considered the well-ascertained intention of tile Legislature and tile only
just interpretation of the statutes themselves.
And when it is borne in mind that it is the universally received doctrine in
conmmon-law countries tlhat whetl one State or nation adopts the written laws
of another it will be deemed to have adopted along witl those laws the known
conlstrnction placed upon them by tile courts of the country from which they
were derived, and that tliat construction becomes as much a part of tle law of
tle land as the statutes themselves, and whenl it is further borne in mind that
courts are constitute to expound, not to make the law, and that it is their
province "to administer tlhe law as they find it," I cannot entertain a doubt
as to what construction and rule of decision ought to be adopted on the present
occasion.
The doctrine of tlle binding force of precedents (says Chancellor Kent) has
becle insisted on by the most eminent jurists and the most enlightened courts.
And lie quotes and approves tll exceedingly forcible language upon this
subject of that great Itntn and enmilmnt jurist, Sir William Jones, whose exaltedl
genius explored atnd fatlhomedl almost every branch of legal Iand political
science, and, indeed, of hmn:an knowledge wioe said, "No man who is not 'a
lawyer would know how to act, and no mal: who is a lawyer would, in many
instances, know wlat to advise, ulles courts C were bound by authority a.s
firmly (as tile Pa;gan deities were suill)osed to be bound by the decrees of fate."
Although, in my opinion, tle construction of tle statute [126] which has
hitherto prevailed, and to which I ladlere, is based upon reason as well as authority,
and is not less certainly supported by tle one tlian the other, it would
at least be superfluous if not even presumptuous in me to enter upon a formal
vindication of the reasonableness of a series of adjudications so numerous, and
proceeding from sources of so hligl authority. And if, in my conception, it
did a(lmit of doubt as to what construction ought originally to have prevailed,
if I may be permitted to adopt the language and( the sentiment of Mr. Justice
Baldwin on the occasion of an inquiry not unlike the present, "It sufficed for
this case to show by a brief reference wlhat tle law for more tlan a cectulry
hlas beetle and now is, without ever so far departing from wllat I deem my judicial
d(lty as to even inquire what it ought to be; as if it was in my power to
abrogate or vary froln its rules oil this or aly other subject. Where a point
is decidedd by adjudged cases, or laid down as settled in the books of acknowledged
authority, I take it and feel bound to act upotl it as the common law,
which is infused into our jurisprudence, unless some act of the Legislature or
some decision of this court prescribes another rule. When tllis court declares
that ' we are entirely content to adllilnister tile law as we find it,' I feel bound
to endeavor to find, an(I whbe found, to follow it in all its course. And in
searchitug among the fountainls rather than the rivulets of the law for its true
principles(, I apprehend there can be no safer guide than its precedents and
adjudications, which, from ancient times, have embodied atCd preserved unchanged
those principles which time has consecrated by the certainty of the
law, and the security and repose which an alllelence to its rule affords to the
rights of property and person." (14 Pet. R., G26.)
Finally, (in the language of Chanellor Kent, 6 Johns. R., 436,) "If tile Gordian
knot is to be cut, we ought at least to call for the dignus vindice nodus.
There ought to be an object befitting so bold a precedent.' In the present
case [127] there is nothing which should disturb the tranquil course of the law.
63
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Texas. Supreme Court. Reports of cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas during a part of December term, 1849, at Austin and a part of Galveston Term, 1851. Volume 5., book, 1883; St. Louis, Mo.. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28569/m1/71/: accessed May 7, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; .