Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, during the latter part of the Austin term, 1884, and the Tyler term, 1884. Volume 62. Page: 421
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188t.] FIKANKLAND V. CASSADAY. 421
Opinion of the court.
The general rule as quoted from Wells on Res Adjudicata and Stare
Decisis, it will be noticed, qualifies the universality of its application
by the statement that the court of ultimate resort " will selldom"
reconsider or reverse its previous decision in the same cause, even
when it appears to the court to have been erroneously decided;
thus stated, it would seem that the rule which has been generally
accepted as unquestionable, goes at least to the extent that only in
exceptional cases will the court exercise its discretion in deviating
from its ordinary application.
The rule under consideration is laid down and followed, it would
seem, in some of the states without any qualification whatever, and
even inexorably applied in cases in which the former decision is
admitted to have been "in abrogation of one of fthe plainest principles
of law." See Wells on Res. Adjudicata, sec. 621, citing and
quoting from Dewey v. Gray, 2 Cal., 377. The ground stated by
the judge delivering the opinion being that "The decision having
been made in this case, it has become the law of the case, and is not
now the subject of revision."
In Vermont the rule is recognized and followed with undeviating
uniformity in its application to all appeals which come within it.
In the case of Stacy v. I. R., 32 Vt., 552, which was presented with
a different statement of facts, but, as the court held, without any
substantial difference, the opinion said: "The rule has been long
established in this state, often declared from the bench, and, we
believe, uniformly adhered to, that in the same cause this court will
not reverse or revise their former decisions. . . . And whatever
views the different members of this court may entertain as to the
soundness of the former decision, we all agree that the doctrine
there enunciated is t) be regarded as the law of the case." The
rule, as stated in Phelan v. San Francisco, 20 Cal., 45, is that "A
previous ruling by the appellate court upon a point distinctly made
may be only authority in other cases, to be followed or affirmed, or
to be modified or overruled, according to its intrinsic merits, but in
the case in which it is made, it is more than authority; it is a final
adjudication from the consequences of which the court cannot
depart, nor the parties relieve themselves." See Wells on Res Adj.,
sec. 613.
In Burns v. Ledbetter, 56 Tex., 282, Chief Justice Gould, referring
to the rule under consideration, points to cases where our supreme
court " has deemed itself justified in departing from the law
as decided on the former appeal; citing Layton v. Hall, 25 Tex., 212;
Peeves v. Petty, 44 Tex., 249; Rogers v. Ragland, 42 Tex., 422;
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Texas. Supreme Court. Cases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, during the latter part of the Austin term, 1884, and the Tyler term, 1884. Volume 62., book, 1885; Austin, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28512/m1/443/: accessed May 6, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; .