Texas Almanac, 1992-1993 Page: 600
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600 TEXAS ALMANAC 1992-1993
Spaniards. Avenues, other than the military, that were
approved and available included service in the church,
in colonial administration or in the royal government.
Unlike other European countries, Spain developed
no sizable stable middle-class. Once an entrepreneur
acquired sufficient wealth, he purchased a title and/or
land and withdrew from commerce. Government
bonds, so necessary to finance the needs of the crown,
attracted money that should have been reinvested in
the nation's economy. Most of the crown's share of pre-
cious metals mined in the Americas lingered in Spain
only long enough to be rerouted to some other Euro-
pean financial center. Colonial revenue ranged from 11
percent of the crown's income in 1554 to 20 percent in
1598. It was never any larger than the income from
church sources and much less than extracted from the
citizens of Castile. As time went on, a larger percent of
the American revenue stayed in the colonies for admin-
istration and for public works. Little of the newly gener-
ated wealth was pumped into the nation's economic life,
and Spain missed the opportunity to build a stable, effi-
cient economic base.
The church and the nobility controlled most of
Spain's productive land, and much of the holdings were
not used efficiently. Agricultural production increased
only by cultivating more land, not from innovation or
improved farming techniques.
So the Spanish empire limped on, a marvel of resil-
iency in a Europe almost totally aligned against it.
Philip II took his role in government seriously. He
felt personally responsible to God for the well-being of
each of his subjects. Every effort was made to operate
the government within the moral teachings of the
church, though it is ironical that the Spanish crown's in-
terpretation of these teachings often coincided with the
demands of practical politics.
One example of this concern came in 1573 when
Spanish colonial policy was changed to allow priests to
lead in the pacification of newly contacted natives in
the American colonies. The harsh, brutal military tac-
tics that conquered most of the colonies was aban-From Previous Page
the wealthiest Spaniards of the day and probably the
best administrator, although his military experience
at sea was limited.
Once men and materiel were gathered on board
ship, it was imperative for the armada to depart, lest
food and water spoil and disease break out among the
cooped-up personnel. Medina Sidonia took the arma-
da to sea on May 30, and it immediately ran into in-
clement weather that was to dog the operation until
the end.
One hundred and thirty seven ships sailed that
day, 109 of them fighting ships and the others supply
vessels. More than 1,000 cannons were on board. The
ships were manned by 8,000 sailors, and 19,000 soldiers
were carried, partly to fight sea battles and partly to
reinforce Parma's invasion troops.
By July 18, the armada was ten miles off the coast
of Plymouth. Medina Sidonia's instructions from
King Philip II were to engage the enemy if attacked,
but not to seek out the enemy. The primary goal was
to defend Parma's troops as they crossed the channel
near Margate. That night the English coastline was
ablaze with bonfires, lighted to warn of the long-
awaited coming of the Spanish armada.
Much has been made of the strategy of the En-
glish and Spanish ships that faced one another in the
channel for the next two weeks.
Spanish ships were slower and more heavily
loaded than the English, for they fought with a philos-
ophy of land-bound warriors. Their strategy, which
had been successful, was to move in close to the ene-
my ships, catch them with grappling hooks, and
board them. Hence, the large complement of soldiers
on board. The ships also were constructed with board-
ing operations in mind. Large "castles" were placed
on the fore and aft on the ship to facilitate boarding
an enemy ship that is more easily jumped down upon
than climbed up onto in combat.
The heavy guns carried by the Spanish ships were
accurate only at close range, for they were used just
prior to the boarding operations to soften up the ene-
my.
On the other hand, the English were evolving adoned, and the army was only to provide protection for
the missionaries. Under this policy, the missions of
Texas were established in the 18th century.
Although governing with the aid of seven depart-
ments, Philip personally made every decision - every
one! - whether a minor household matter or a major
military strategy. He read and annotated every dis-
patch and report in his government and then discussed
the issues with pertinent advisers. Obviously, the proc-
ess was time-consuming, and distance compounded the
time needed for a decision. Critics quipped that if
Spain's bureaucrats administered death, everyone
would live to a ripe old age.
From a modern perspective, the administration was
inefficient. But Philip II - and to a lesser extent his
father, Charles V - was pioneering the first colonial
system of worldwide proportions. Indeed, Spain was
uniquely qualified for the task, for kingdoms of that
country had for centuries operated colonies on a small-
er scale. In the 12th century, Catalonia colonized parts
of Greece and Sicily and pioneered the use of viceroys
as the king's representatives in these territorities. Just
prior to Columbus' contact with the New World, Spain
subjugated the Canary Islands and gained experience
in dealing with people of a different, less cosmopolitan
culture. (Indeed, with Jewish and Muslim subjects,
Spain for a time had been Europe's only multiracial,
multicultural country.)
Various land policies used in the New World - such
as the encomienda in which natives' labor was given
Spanish subjects in reward for military contributions
- were developed during the Reconquista.
Despite the system's many and obvious shortcom-
ings, Spain did control its American colonies for more
than 300 years, while England, with far less territory
colonized in North America, lost control of its colonies
in less than half that time.
While treaties and truces gave Spain some respite
from war early in Philip's reign, events in the last half
of the 16th century brought turmoil and disaster.new method of sea warfare that would eventually
dominate ocean fighting in later generations. But it
was not perfected in 1588.
First of all, many of the English ships were longer
and sat lower in the water than their Spanish coun-
terparts. They carried as many guns - but of longer
range - as the Spanish, and the English ships were
not as heavily laden with men, supplies and materiel.
Their evolving strategy was to bludgeon enemy ships
with long-range artillery, attempting to sink, not cap-
ture, the craft. Under no circumstances did the En-
glish commanders want to get close enough to the
Spanish ships to board. They were lost if they did.
So for more than two weeks, the two forces spar-
red and battled almost the length of the channel. The
English battered the Spanish ships from afar, causing
considerable damage to some, but sinking none. Most
of the ships lost by the armada in the channel were
damaged in accidents or by sabotage. The sleeker,
faster English ships adroitly kept their distance,
greatly frustrating the Spanish. Introduced by the En-
glish Admiral Charles Howard was the line of fire,
which later became a standard naval tactic. English
ships in a line would pass a Spanish ship, unloading
rapid broadsides on the enemy. The tactic wreaked
havoc on ships and morale.
On only two days during the conflict did the Span-
ish have the wind advantage, and on both occasions,
the English avoided Spanish attempts to board.
The major breakdown in Spanish strategy came
when Parma was unprepared to cross the channel.
Many of the flat-bottomed barges built for the opera-
tion were unseaworthy and his problems were com-
pounded by a Dutch blockade of the shallows along
the coast of the channel. Without aid from the fleet, he
could not have left port, and the fleet had no shallow-
draft ships to help him. A breakdown in communica-
tions was the final nail in the coffin of the grand
scheme.
On July 29, the English finally defeated the Span-
ish off the coast of Graveline, Flanders, but they were
stopped from sinking it by a heavy rain squall that
struck in the late afternoon. The following morning, a
Continued on Next Page600
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Kingston, Mike. Texas Almanac, 1992-1993, book, 1991; Dallas, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth279642/m1/604/: accessed April 28, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Texas State Historical Association.