The Congressional Globe, Volume 13, Part 2: Twenty-Eighth Congress, First Session Page: 84
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APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE.
Jan. 1844.
28th Cong 1st Sess.
Moliiion Petitions—Mr. Saunders.
H. of Reps.
freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances."
Now, sir, I doubt not the cause suggested by my
friend from South Carolina, [Mr. Rhett,]—the riot
and sedition acts, as they existed in the mother
country—was the true cause of inserting this prohib-
itory article in the amendments to the constitution.
But, whatever may have been its origin, we find it
in the constitution, and as intended to guard the per-
sonal privileges of the citizen; and as such it com-
mands oiu* respect. You shall make no law (and
the rules of this House, as I admit, are laws, so far
as this matter is concerned) abridging the freedom
of speech. Yet, at the last Congress, you adopted
the one-hour rule, and have again adopted it, thus
limiting every member m his right of speech to one
hour. Again, you have a rule authorizing a call for
the previous question, which, when sustained by a
majority, closes all debate, and even cuts off debate
at the outset, if then put and carried.
These rules most clearly abridge the freedom of
speech-, yet they rest on the power of the House—a
power which belongs to all parliamentary bodies—
of regulating its own proceedings. Your one-hour
rule presupposes the indulgence of unlimited debate
as retarding the business of the House; and your
previous question is founded on the belief that any
debate is injurious to the public interest. Hence,
whilst many have, and still question the propriety
of these rules, none can deny your power to enact
them, as a means of regulating abuses.
Again: Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of the press; and though I be no advocate
for sedition laws, and would sooner gee it run into
licentiousness than have it curtailed in its privileges,
yet I suppose none can doubt the power of Con-
gress to make it an indictable offence for any press
here to libel a member by a false charge of bri-
bery. But to the matter in debate.
lit is asserted that the rule violates the right of pe-
tition. How? Because it excludesthe petition from
being received, heard, and acted on. By the par-
liamentary law, no petition is receivable unless on
leave; aim, as modified by the rules of the House,
any member may object, and raise the question of
reception—determinable by a majority. This is the
principle on which the rule for excluding abolition
petitions rests. A majority desire to save the time
of the House by avoidujg this question of reception
ot) every petition which is debatable, and because
they believe Congress possesses no power to legis-
late on such matters; or if they have the power to
legislate, they ought, not to do so; and hence the rule
for excluding such subjects altogether. It is the
solemn judgment of a majority, adopted after argu-
ment and deliberation. It is the very question we
aie now considering, whether this rule shall stand
a ■ the judgment of the House.
But it is said, you do not give the petition a hear-
ing, and, says my colleague, [Mr. Clingman,] you
cannot know that the petition asks for that which is
unconstitutional, without a hearing. And herein,
Mi. iS'peaker, consists the fallacy of the argument,
because it is not true in point of fact. Your rule de-
clares "that no petition or oilier paper, praying the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or
any State or Territory, or the slave-trade between
the States, shall be received by the House." Now,
sir, unless the prayer of the petition asks for one
of these i'oui things, the rule has no effect. The rule
does not attach, nor is the Speaker authorized to
put it m force until he learns from the member, oi
by reading it himself, that its prayer embraces one
of these objects. The member is heard, and, through
him, the petitioner speaks, in a "brief statement"
of the contents of the petition; not by giving the ar-
gument, but the facts, and what it is the petition
asks to be done. It is on this statement that the
Speaker pronounces the decision of the House, as
declared by the majority in the adoption of the rules,
that they will not legislate on the subject of abol-
islung slavery in the States, the District, the Terri-
tories, or the slavp trade between the States; and
therefore it is they will not receive any petition
touching these matters.
I admit, whenever a majority are prepared for
legislation on any one of these subjects, the rule
should be so modified or rescinded. But unless
the majority are thus prepared for action, the ruie
should stand; as I think I have succeeded in show-
ing it neither abridges any right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, nor does it exclude them from a
hearing. They certainly do not claim to be heard
st our bar, or to have their petitions read and print-
ed, unless it be the pleasure of the House to grant
it, as a matter of respect, or with a view to its own
information. This is a favor which the House ex-
tends at its own discretion. These abolition peti-
tioners are heard as all other petitioners, and are
answered by the rule. The journals of the House
show the names of those who vote for the rule, and
thus declare to the petitioners, who are in favor and
who are against their petitions.
I repeat, then, according to our rule's of proceed-
ing, the petition is heard and considered, and the re-
sult is made known by the presiding officer of the
House, when he is called on to execute the rale.
The answer is, then, as distinctly given as if a vote
was had on each and every petition. I ask, then,
why receive, debate, and consider each petition
separately, when the judgment of the House has
been formed and taken against them collectively?
Such is not the course of proceeding in our courts,
where the rights of person and of property are in-
volved. Res judicata is a rule of jurisprudence, not
only from its fitness and propriety,but because, with-
out it, an end could never be had to litigation. X do
not mean to say the present Congress should refuse
to grant what has been refused by its predecessors;
but I do say, common respect for ourselves requires
that we should adhere to and maintain our own
judgments.
But it is demanded that we should treat these abo-
lition petitions with the same respect we do all
others; and that we dare not thus treat the petition
of the revolutionary soldifer. I will not stop to in-
quire whether the abolitionist be entitled to the same
respect as the soldier of the revolution, whose work
he seeks to destroy. But how stands the case of the
soldier? Your law has declared your soldier shall
only be entitled to a pension on showing six months'
service, or more; ana his widow, on proof of mar-
riage prior to the year 1794. Now, would you re-
ceive and consider the petition of the soldier, if he
only claimed a service of three months? or that of
his widow, if married subsequent to the period fixed
by law? If you did, it would be from mere courte-
sy, or with the view of changing the law—considera-
tions which do not operate in favor of abolition peti-
tions. In the case of the soldier, the law answers
the petition; in the case of the abolitionist, the rule
of the House gives the answer. In either case, the
reception and consideration of the petition would be
a useless consumption of time.
This brings mo to the question, whether the rule
be in itself right and proper' I understood the gen- i
tleman from New York [Mr. Beardsley] to admit,
if the petition asked Congress to interfeie with the
institutions of slavery within the States, it was what
we could not constitutionally do, and therefore'such
petitions should not be received; but if it asked the
abolition of slavery within the District of Columbia,
it then became a question of expediency, and such
petitions should be received. Now, sir, this is the
very question I desire to meet and to answer. It is
admitted it is not constitutionally competent for
Congress to interfere with slavery as it exists in the
States; so I deny that Congress possesses any right-
ful power to abolish slavery within this District. The
constitution contains no grant or power to appropri-
ate the public money for any such purposes. The
gentleman from New York admits the master's right
o) property in the services of his slave. It is an ad-
mission any one, not a maniac, or infected with the
mania of abolitionism, is forced to make. This right
of property existed both in Virginia and Maryland
at the time of their deeds of cession to the United
States of this District. As early as 1715, Maryland,
then a colony, declared all persons of color within
its jurisdiction, or who might be brought there, and
their descendants, should be slaves for life. Such
was the statute law in Maryland; ar.d the same prin-
ciple pi evaded in Virginia. The act of cession con-
tains the following proviso:
"That nothing herein contained shall be construed
to vest in the United States any right of property in
the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals therein."
And although it has been contended that this con-
dition only applied to the rights of individuals in the
soil, it will tie found from the scope of the whole
act, that this is too narrow a construction; and that
it is intended to guard and protect personal rights
generally. But however that may be, I do not rest
my argument on that ground. 1 say this protection
of individuals in their property is secured by a much
higher power: it is to be found in the constitution itself.
The fifth article of the amendments declares, "Nor
shall private property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation," This direct recognition of
private property, and that it can only be taken for
"public use," excludes the idea of its being taken for
any other purpose. I tiad supposed the gentleman
from New York [Mr. Beardsley] and myself be-
longed to the same political school, so far at least
•as the constitutional powers of Congress were in-
volved; that we both drew our test and rules of
construction from the same high source; that, whilst
discarding the modern doctrine of' the general wel-
fare, which substituted the will of the majority for
the constitution, we adhered to the good o'ld.repub-
lican principles of 1798, as established by Madison
and Jefferson, and as carried out by honest George
Clinton, when, as Vice President, he gave the cast-
ing vote for the rejection of a renewal of the char-
ter of the United States Bank. But I fear,- with
the gentleman, as with others who claim to be
within the republican fold, what was then deemed
sound in principle is now to be taken as southern
abstractions. Will the gentleman turn to the eighth
section of the first article of the constitution, and
tell me if he finds there any power to appropriate
the public money to the purchase of slaves? Yet
in that section is to be found an enumeration of
your constitutional powers. In that section I read
that Congress shall have power, inter alia, "to lay
and collect taxes; to pay debts; to borrow money;
to regulate commerce; to establish post offices and
post roads; to declare war." Does the gentleman
concur with that political class who derive the
power to carry on a general system of internal
improvements from the power to regulate com-
merce? or does he derive it from the power to
establish post offices and post roads? or will he
■ seek it in the war power? No, says the gentleman;
he subscribes to no such political heresies. But
within this District you possess unlimited jurisdic-
tion; here your powers are as omnipotent as that of
Parliament itself, because here you have the right
'to exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever."
I shall not question the right of Congress to legisla-
tion within this District, to the exclusion of all other
legislative bodies; but still it does not follow that
your powers, even here, are without limit or restric-
tion. If so, what becomes of the prohibition
against an order of nobility, or of an established re-
ligion, and the free exercise thereof? Can you have
an order of nobility and an established church with-
in the limits of these ten miles square? And why
not' Because of the injunctions of the constitution.
And is not the injunction that private property shall
not be taken but for public use, and that on compensa-
tion, just as obligatory in the one case as in the other?
The same article of the constitution gives to Con-
gress the power to erect forts, magazines, and arse-
nals, and grants it the "like authority" as within
the District. And am I to be told the land ceded
by North Caiolina for an arsenal may be made the
reccptacle for slaves, and that Congress possesses
the power of declaring that every slave who may
enter its limits shall be free? If so, cannot you go'
farther, and say they shall be armed and received
into your military ranks, and thus give us here
(what are to be found elsewhere) regiments of
blacks? Can gentlemen be surprised, that every
southern man should feel startled at such a claim of
power? And to this end must it lead, if not met
and resisted at the threshold. I know the gentle-
man from New York said, while he claimed the
right of emancipation, he waived the question of
compensation. Now, with due submission, he
must allow me to say this was dodging the question.
Your right to emancipate depends upon your power
to compensate. I say you have no constitutional
competency to appropriate the public money to any
such object; and therefore you cannot emancipate.
I do not question your right to pass laws authorizing
their owners themselves to manumit, either by will
or deed. What I deny is, your power to raise by
taxes, levied on the thirteen slaveholding States, the
means of purchasing from their owners, within this
District, their slaves, with or without their consent.
I will not say, Whenever you exercise this power of
emancipation within this District, the Union is dis-
solved: I use no such threat. But this I will say,
When you shall be so reckless of consequences as
to do such an act, it will be no longer a debatable
question; but every man who is not faithless to his
own household will stand to his arms.
And now, Mr. Speaker, allow me to notice the
personal allusion of the gentleman from Massachu-
setts, [Mr. Hudson."! That gentleman has thought
fit to ask me (for what purpose I know not) if I did
not myself, years ago, introduce an abolition peti-
tion. The aame matter has been repeatedly brought
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United States. Congress. The Congressional Globe, Volume 13, Part 2: Twenty-Eighth Congress, First Session, book, 1844; Washington D.C.. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth2368/m1/94/: accessed April 26, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.