The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 77, July 1973 - April, 1974 Page: 87
568 p. : ill. (some col.), maps, ports. ; 23 cm.View a full description of this periodical.
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The Influence of Jomini on Scott's Campaign
political in the history of the Republic, and no one understood its implica-
tions any better than Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln's unyielding certitude as
to the political origins of the conflict and his zealous determination to hold
the issue of constitutional crisis before the American people led inexorably
to his strategic concept of how the war should be waged. To Lincoln's mind,
it had to be fought in a way which would result in the quickest victory.
Because he was desperate, he believed such victory was possible only through
invasion of the enemy's territory and through destruction of the enemy's
army. Inevitably, Lincoln's dogma led to the type of warfare which was
exemplified by Grant, that foremost soldier-advocate of speed and exter-
mination.
It does not follow, however, that this political conviction produced the
best utilization of the armies. It is well known, of course, that most Union
generals viewed the situation differently. They saw the conduct of war from
the military standpoint and not from the political. This is not to say that
Lincoln's military philosophy was incompatible with the political require-
ments of the age. It may have been very compatible, but raison d'e'tat does
not necessarily argue for military correctness. Grant may have been the
savior of his country, he may have satisfied Lincoln, and he may have been
successful; but these circumstances do not alter the possibility that, in purely
military terms, a better system of war may well have been available and that
system may have been Jominian.
The questions which must be asked are these-why was Jomini held in
such high regard by the professional officer corps of the United States
army and why did the military textbooks reflect his doctrine? One answer
to both questions, of course, is that more than any other military author,
he best described the great age of war which had just passed. To most
observers before Jomini, Napoleon's movements across Europe seemed erra-
tic. His insistence on columnar attack seemed wasteful in view of the con-
cept of the economy of force. His logistical support too often seemed ham-
pered by what the German theorist, Dietrich von Biilow, would have con-
sidered to be overextended communications. Rarely, however, were these
criticisms valid. With clarity of thought and facility of pen, Jomini destroyed
these misconceptions. Sound tactical and strategic doctrine was, in fact, to
be found in Napoleonic warfare.
There is perhaps another reason why Jomini was so highly regarded in
the United States, a reason which has yet to be explored by military his-
torians. Jomini was believed because he had been put to the test in an
earlier American war, and he had not been found wanting. Furthermore,
he had been tested by one whom many considered to be the greatest of all
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Texas State Historical Association. The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 77, July 1973 - April, 1974, periodical, 1973/1974; Austin, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth117148/m1/105/: accessed April 28, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Texas State Historical Association.