The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 96, July 1992 - April, 1993 Page: 20
681 p. : ill. (some col.), maps, ports. ; 23 cm.View a full description of this periodical.
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Southwestern Historzcal Quarterly
the engagement always won the fight. From the sample of twenty-five
skirmishes initiative can be determined in eighteen cases, of which four
were Indian victories and fourteen were won by the army. The army
had a total of nineteen victories, the additional five victories achieved
by other factors such as overwhelming force and firepower.
Surprise is striking the enemy in an unexpected manner, time, or
place. It confuses the enemy and diminishes his ability to react. The
soldiers achieved surprise in 36 percent of the sample, and in 12 per-
cent it was achieved by the Indians. The sample is narrow in that in
over one-half of the engagements the record is unclear as to the ele-
ment of surprise. In only two cases, however, could the surprise be con-
sidered the decisive factor in the success of the unit. In one example a
small group of soldiers routed and put to flight a much larger party of
Indian warriors. In the second example a group of well-concealed
Lipans ambushed a four-soldier wagon escort at a waterhole, killing
one trooper and causing the other three to desert the wagons they were
protecting.2
Force ratio is the relative strength of one force in relation to an op-
posing enemy. In these small-unit actions related to Fort Inge the calcu-
lated force ratios do not seem to have been an important factor in the
army patrol leader's decision to fight. In modern tactical situations it is
a rule of thumb that the attacker needs at least a three-to-one superi-
ority to overcome the natural advantage of the defender. The differ-
ence in arms as an exponent in the force ratio equation is mitigated by
several factors. The Indians often had firearms, and such arms are
mentioned in 2o percent of the combat reports from Fort Inge. Inside
the fifty to one hundred meter effective range the bow and arrow had a
rate of fire advantage over the rifle but not the early six-shot round-ball
Army Colt. The force ratio can be calculated in about one-half of the
sample of Fort Inge unit combats. In six (24 percent) engagements the
army held a favorable ratio. In two cases the ratio was 4: 1 or greater, in
four cases a 2: 1 or 3:1 advantage in personnel over their Indian op-
ponents. In an equal number of engagements, however, six or 24 per-
cent, the force ratio was unfavorable to the army. Of these unfavorable
ratios in which the Indians outnumbered the soldiers, three were 1:4
or worse, and there were three in the 1: 2 or 1:3 range. It would
seem sensible that given circumstances where he was outnumbered the
army patrol leader would choose the hasty defense as the best course
32Nine soldiers of Company B, Second Cavalry, surprised a Lipan camp of over fourteen
lodges on April 4, 1857, Hart, Old Forts of the Southwest, 47. The Indian ambush occurred
March 3, 1850 on the road between Fort Inge and Fort Duncan. Post Returns, Fort Inge, Mar.
1850.
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Texas State Historical Association. The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 96, July 1992 - April, 1993, periodical, 1993; Austin, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth101215/m1/46/: accessed June 4, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Texas State Historical Association.