The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 88, July 1984 - April, 1985 Page: 77
476 p. : ill. (some col.), maps, ports. ; 23 cm.View a full description of this periodical.
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The End of Slavery in Texas
that the Thirteenth Amendment applied to areas not embraced by
Lincoln's proclamation.9
The majority opinion in the Emancipation Proclamation Cases of
1868 largely settled the matter of slavery's legal death date in Texas.
In 1869, the state supreme court reversed the decision of a district
court in Red River County that had set aside a contract dated August
4, 1864, that traded land for a slave. The lower court had held that
slavery had ended on January 1, 1863; but slavery still existed in 1864,
said Chief Justice Morrill, so "the credulity of the purchaser of the
slaves, that they would continue such, however baseless to others, who
had different views and notions, furnishes no cause for action." Put
more directly, the higher court would not deliver a purchaser from
his own bad judgment. During the following year, 1870, Justice Lind-
say used his own opinion from Hall v. Keese (1868) to reverse a lower
court decision from Grimes County that a slave bill of sale dated
January 5, 186o, could be set aside because the bondsmen were war-
ranted "slaves for life." Such a warranty was a proper guarantee of
their legal status until June 19, 1865, Lindsay ruled, and never was a
surety against future emancipation.'o
During the Edmund J. Davis administration in Texas, from early
1870 to January, 1874, the state supreme court appeared somewhat
reluctant to follow the precedents of the Emancipation Proclamation
Cases. In Morris v. Ranney (1872), another case arising from a promis-
sory note made for the hire of a slave, Associate Justice Moses B.
Walker, a former Union army officer, praised the "consummate
ability" of Justice Hamilton's dissenting opinion in the landmark
cases and found a way to rule without using the majority opinion as
a precedent. The slaves, whether free or not, performed the services
for which they were hired, he said, so the note had to be paid. "We
will not," he continued, "at this time disturb the previous rulings of
the court, divided as it was, hoping that these difficult and trouble-
some matters shall soon cease to trouble the tribunals of the country."
The next year, Justice Wesley Ogden, a unionist born in New York,
ruled in Dowell v. Russell that a promissory note for the purchase of
a slave dated June 15, 1865, could be voided. "Without entering again
olbid., 508 (3rd and 4th quotations), 534-550, 551 (1st quotation), 552 (2nd quotation),
553-556. Hamilton and Caldwell, much like Lindsay and Latimer, were southern-born
unionists who had come to Texas before the Civil War. Webb, Carroll, and Branda (eds.),
Handbook of Texas, I, 759-76o, III, 134.
10Algier v. Black, 32 Tex. 168-169, 17o (1st quotation); McDaniel v. White, 32 Tex. 489
(2nd quotation), 490o-491.
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Texas State Historical Association. The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume 88, July 1984 - April, 1985, periodical, 1984/1985; Austin, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth101210/m1/99/: accessed April 28, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Texas State Historical Association.